We provide a classification of noninterference-based security properties for the formal analysis of secure information flow in concurrent and distributed systems. This is done in the setting of a process algebra modeling some Linda coordination primitives (asynchronous communication and read operation). For this purpose, we define relaxed notions of behavioural equivalence that take into account the observational power of the external observer. The resulting taxonomy is compared with analogous security definitions based on synchronous communication models, thus emphasizing the influence of the Linda coordination model upon the expressivity of the security properties, by giving a new intuition to the relative merits.
Introduction
New networking technologies, such as mobile and portable devices, support an increasing development of concurrent and distributed applications that adapt themselves to the dynamic nature of the environment. Such new classes of applications require a careful design process. In particular, formal models and languages, which can be successfully used during the preliminary modeling phase, must deal with the several issues that affect the design and management of dynamic systems. Coordination models and languages represent a promising approach for modeling and analysing applications based on a dynamically reconfigurable communication system (see, e.g., Linda [16] and [10, 9] for a survey on coordination languages). Such models and languages distinguish between the internal behaviour of the components and their interactions. Since the environment may replace or alter the entities and the interactions involved in the communication, critical security aspects come into play. In order to analyse the robustness of open systems against potentially hostile mobile components or unintentional security flaws, confidentiality issues have been deeply treated in several formal models for the design of multi-level security systems (e.g., see [14, 30] for a survey). In particular, semantics-based models relying on the noninterference approach to information flow theory represent a successful approach (see, e.g., [23, 15] and the references therein). In this setting the system behaviour is analysed in order to capture possible interferences among components at different levels of security. More precisely, the noninterference idea [17] is expressed by the following intuition. The lack of information flow from high-to low-security levels is guaranteed if the interactions observed at the low level are invariant under changes in the high level.
As a step towards bridging the gap between the security and the coordination communities, in this paper we relate the noninterference approach to secure information flow analysis and the coordination model for communication. In [1] we preliminarily started such an integration between noninterference analysis and coordination model by rephrasing two noninterference properties [13] in the setting of a process algebra including some Linda coordination primitives, asynchronous communication and read operation. In this paper, we extend the formal framework of [1] to study more deeply the influence of the communication structure upon the security issues. For this purpose, we formalize several security properties and we compare the resulting taxonomy with a corresponding classification of security definitions obtained in a classical framework based on synchronous communication, thus emphasizing the merits of every security definition within each particular communication structure.
With respect to a synchronous communication model, in which the system must agree with the external environment on the input/output events to be performed if we want that they really happen, in an asynchronous model the output operations are autonomously performed by the system. In essence, the system emits an output message and afterwards proceeds with its execution while the message travels in the ether until it reaches its destination. Instead, like in the synchronous communication model, an input event takes place the instant the environment activates that input. In the security community, a symmetric management of input and output events is motivated by the need of capturing each possible interference between high-level components and low-level ones (see, e.g., [18] ). On the other hand, in real cases there may be several output communications that cannot be refused, such as the appearance of information on a screen, and that allow the system to proceed just after performing them (as also emphasized, e.g., in [29] ). Since the occurrence of such events is entirely uninfluenced by the (potentially hostile) environment, it is clear that the expressive power of security properties naturally depends on the communication model we adopt.
The formal framework we employ to study how the communication model affects the security properties is borrowed from [8] and [13] . More precisely, we use an adapted version of LINPA [8] (LINda in Process Algebra) for security analysis, which can be considered a variant of SPA [13] (Security Process Algebra) with asynchronous communication and read operation. Both calculi are inspired by the nondeterministic process algebra CCS [25] . In this integrated framework, we rephrase some security properties taken from [13, 15, 34 ].
In the model we adopt, asynchronous communication is realized by means of a so-called tuplespace, which represents a shared box to which messages (also called tuples) can be explicitly sent through output operations and from which the same messages can be read (removed) via reading (input) operations. From the viewpoint of an external observer, the focus moves from the interaction between the system and the environment to the content of the tuplespace. In other words, since communications take place through access to the tuplespace, what an observer can see is just the tuplespace. In a security context, external observers that access the tuplespace are classified depending on their access clearance. In particular, as usual in security models, we take into consideration a two-level security architecture. Therefore, we divide the tuplespace into a high-level part containing confidential tuples (which are handled by high-level users only) and a low-level part containing public messages (which are generated and can be consumed by low-level users only). An illegal information flow occurs whenever alterations of the public portion of the tuplespace are caused by the operations of the high-level user conducted on the confidential portion of the tuplespace. To compare the effect (visible at the low level) of the interactions between the system and the tuplespace under different high-level strategies, we need a notion of behavioural equivalence. The security properties we investigate are essentially based on two possible assumptions concerning the semantics of a system: a trace-based semantics and a bisimilarity-based semantics. In both cases, we define adequate notions of equivalences that are appropriate to express the observational power of the external observer in the presence of an explicit communication medium modeled by the tuplespace. In particular, we show that the taxonomy of the security properties we obtain, as well as compositionality results and expressive power, strictly depend on the equivalence notion we adopt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe the process algebra, called security asynchronous language (SAL, for short), its syntax and semantics, and the behavioural equivalences that represent the formal framework for the definition of the security properties. In particular, we define a trace-based equivalence and three bisimilarity-based equivalences. Then, in Sect. 3 we introduce several noninterference properties along the same line of [13] . Through some examples, we study their expressive power, by emphasizing similarities and differences with respect to the synchronous setting of [13] . Finally, in Sect. 4 we report on related work and some conclusions.
Security Asynchronous Language
The constituent elements of any synchronous process algebra are the actions, which represent interactions between the system and the environment. In a Linda-like asynchronous setting, the basic elements are the messages, which can be put in (removed from) the tuplespace. Formally, we denote by M, ranged over by a, b, . . ., the set of message names. As usual in security models, we distinguish between high-level message names, denoted by set M H , and low-level message names, denoted by set M L . M H and M L are two disjoint sets that form a covering of M.
The security asynchronous language (SAL) is a variant of LINPA [8] , which in turn is an asynchronous version of CCS [25] . In particular, SAL is equipped with the input, output, and read operations, and, with respect to LINPA, is enriched with the hiding operator, which is needed for the definition of security properties. Indeed, abstraction is used to specify the observational power of the external observer, depending on the security level of such an observer. The set of process terms is generated by the grammar:
where 0 is the empty process (we usually omit it when it is clear from the context), | and + are the standard CCS parallel composition and alternative choice operators, \a is the restriction operator, which prevents the execution of actions of type a ∈ M, /a is the hiding operator, which turns all the actions of type a ∈ M into internal, invisible actions. Moreover, for each constant Z we have a corresponding definition Z def = C, where C is guarded on constants [25] . The possible prefixes µ are:
where τ is the internal, unobservable action, and in(a) and out(a) express the usual input and output primitives of Linda, respectively. More precisely, out(a) produces, in one internal step, a new tuple a (containing message a) that is put in the tuplespace. An output operation is non-blocking as it allows the system to proceed just after performing the rendering of the tuple. On the other hand, in(a) removes, if present, the tuple a from the tuplespace. If the tuple to be removed is not present in the tuplespace, then the input operation is blocked. Similarly as the input operation, rd (a) denotes the blocking reading of any message a from the tuplespace. With respect to the input operation, rd (a) does not remove a tuple a from the tuplespace. Tuples are not considered in the syntax of processes. Instead, they are described as states, which are defined as terms generated by the syntax:
In practice, states model the parallel composition of tuples that are present in the tuplespace and processes that handle the tuplespace. We call A, ranged over by P, Q, . . ., the set of agents generated by the grammar above.
The operational semantics of SAL is defined through the structural congruence ≡, which is defined as the smallest congruence that satisfies the axioms of Table 1 . In particular, in axioms (x) and (xi) function fn(P ) denotes the set of free names of P and is defined as follows:
With abuse of notation, in axiom (xii), which is α-conversion, we use P [b/a] to denote the term obtained by renaming all the free occurrences of the name a in P with the fresh name b.
Then, we define the operational semantics of SAL as the labelled transition system (A, Act, →), where states are agents of SAL, Act is the set of transition labels, and →⊆ A×Act ×A is defined as the least transition relation satisfying the axioms and the rules of Table 2 . Set Act is ranged over by π, π , . . . and contains label τ , denoting an internal action, and the set of labels denoting visible actions. In particular, for each a ∈ M, Act includes labelā, expressing the output of a tuple a to the environment, label a, expressing the consumption of a tuple a from the tuplespace, and label a, expressing the reading of a tuple a from the tuplespace. We denote with O the set of labels expressing output operations and with I the set of labels denoting input/read operations,
Since the set of message names is partitioned into high-level names and lowlevel ones, we also partition L into high-level labels and low-level ones, denoted by sets Act H and Act L , respectively, such that α ∈ {a,ā, a}
Finally, we call L(P ) the set of the transition labels that syntactically occur in the operational semantics of P , A H = {P ∈ A | L(P ) ⊆ Act H ∪ {τ }} the set of high-level agents of A, and A O H = {P ∈ A | L(P ) ⊆ {Act H ∩ O} ∪ {τ }} the set of high-level agents that do not execute input/read operations. Table 1 Structural congruence for SAL.
In the security framework, we sometimes employ static operators that limit their scope to certain transition labels only. For instance, in the case of the restriction operator, we define the operators P \ I a and P \ O a, as specified by the following semantics:
which restrict input and read operations only and output operations only, respectively. Similarly, we also define the operators P/ O a and P/ I a: Table 2 Operational semantics of SAL.
which hideā labelled transitions only, and a, a labelled transitions only, respectively.
Behavioural Equivalence
The noninterference properties are necessarily stated using behavioural equivalences. For this purpose, in this section we define a theory of behavioural equivalence for SAL agents. As we will see, a notion of indistinguishability between agents must focus on the observable interactions between the environment and the system at hand. On the one hand, in the setting of a Linda-like asynchronous communication model, an external observer can see and manipulate the tuplespace, while he has no means for inferring whether or not the system is executing input (read) operations. Based on the same intuition, in the literature several notions of equivalence for asynchronous calculi are defined which are mainly based on the bisimilarity theory (see, e.g., [21, 2, 8, 24] and the references therein). On the other hand, the expressive power of the external observer is also limited by the fact that the internal activities of the system cannot be observed, as they do not represent interactions with the environment to which the observer belongs. Hence, we need a notion of behavioural equivalence that abstracts away from τ actions [13, 15] . For instance, based on such a notion of observation, in [4] a trace-based characterization for an operational definition of the may-testing preorder is defined in the setting of the asynchronous versions of CCS and π-calculus.
Based on these considerations, we now introduce adequate equivalences for SAL which join the requirements expressed above and can be used to express noninterference-based security properties. 
If γ is the empty sequence , then
With abuse of notation, we say that α ∈ γ if α occurs in the sequence γ ∈ L * .
Definition 2 Given a sequence γ ∈ L *
, we denote with S γ the set of sequences obtained from γ by replacing each a ∈ γ with (a) *
.
Note that γ ∈ S γ and S γ = {γ} if γ does not include read operations. We now are ready to define a trace-based equivalence for SAL agents.
Definition 3
Given P ∈ A, the set T (P ) of traces associated with P is defined as
A a labelled transition can be simulated by a mixed (possibly empty) sequence of τ and a labelled transitions. This is because a read operation does not alter the content of the tuplespace and, therefore, cannot be revealed by an external observer [8] .
The intuition that the arrival ordering of messages is not under the control of the processes is expressed by the fact that agents out(a).out (b) .P and out (b) .out(a).P are equivalent. On the other hand, with respect to the trace-based characterization of [4] , we do not have that in(a).in (b) .P and in (b) .in(a).P are equivalent. Such an equivalence would lead to ignore some information flow in a security setting. Indeed, although processes are insensitive to the arrival ordering of messages, the inputs they can execute depend on the environment behaviour. We also point out that the rd -trace equivalence extends the standard trace equivalence. Since the external observer is not allowed to observe internal activities and read operations, 0 is equivalent to rd (a).0 as well as 0 is equivalent to τ.0. As standard in a trace-based scenario, we have the following compositionality results.
Proof It is a trivial application of that of [25] .
To deal with more kinds of security flaws -trace semantics is not adequate to reveal, e.g., deadlock -we now introduce a finer notion of equivalence based on the weak bisimulation semantics. In the following, we assume P τ ⇒ P to stand for P ( τ → ) * P . The weak bisimulation equivalence for SAL agents follows the same intuition behind the rd -trace equivalence.
Definition 7 An equivalence relation R on A is a weak rd -bisimulation if (P, Q) ∈ R implies:
Two agents P and Q are weakly rd -bisimilar, written P ≈ B rd Q, if there exists a weak rd -bisimulation R such that (P, Q) ∈ R.
We point out that all the pairs of (non-) rd -trace equivalent agents shown in the previous examples are (non-) weak rd -bisimulation equivalent.
Proof 
Proposition 9 ≈ B rd is preserved by parallel composition and restriction.
Proof By following the same arguments applied in [25] , we shall only prove the result for parallel composition. We have to show that
is a weak rd -bisimulation:
By a symmetric argument, R is a weak rd -bisimulation.
The intuition behind ≈ B rd and ≈ T rd is not exactly the same as that reported in [8] , where a strong rd -bisimulation is defined in such a way that a τ labelled transition cannot be simulated by a a labelled transition. In essence, rd (a).0 and τ.0 are not strong rd -bisimulation equivalent. This is because the behaviour of rd (a).0 is more restrictive than that of τ.0, since the execution of rd (a) implies that a tuple a is present. Both ≈ B rd and ≈ T rd partially lose such an intuition. In our weak setting, we have that rd (a).0 and τ.0 are equivalent as we abstract away from both internal and read actions. However, we also have that, e.g., rd (a).in(e) and τ.in(e) are not equivalent as the execution of in(e) reveals the previous history. Now we show how to define a weak equivalence that preserves the same intuition as that of [8] . This is done by resorting to a simple variant of the observation congruence [25] .
Definition 10 Given P, Q ∈ A, we say that P and Q are rd -equal (observation rd -congruent), written P = rd Q, if and only if
• whenever P α → P , with α = a, then ∃Q such that Q α ⇒ Q and P ≈ B rd Q (and symmetrically);
, and P ≈ B rd Q (and symmetrically).
In essence, the observation rd -congruence expresses almost the same condition as that of the weak rd -bisimulation. The only difference is that in the case of two rd -equal agents P and Q, the first move of P (resp. Q) must be equated by a transition of Q (resp. P ).
Example 11
The agents rd (a).0 and 0, as well as the agents rd (a).0 and rd (b).0, are not rd -equal. In particular, by following the same intuition explained in [8] , rd (a).0 and τ.0 are not rd -equal, while rd (a).P + τ.P = rd τ.P .
Obviously, observation rd -congruence is an equivalence relation [25] and, as stated by the following results, implies weak rd -bisimilarity and is preserved by \, |, and +.
Proof Trivial.
Proposition 13 = rd is preserved by parallel composition, restriction and summation.
Proof The proof is standard and can be derived by following the same arguments applied in [25] and in the proof of Prop. 9.
Since observation rd -congruence is not a bisimulation, we can employ another behavioural equivalence that is both a bisimulation and a congruence, like, e.g., the progressing bisimulation equivalence of [26] . A notion of progressing rd -bisimulation is obtained by extending the definition of observation rd -congruence.
Definition 14 An equivalence relation R on A is a progressing rd -bisimulation if (P, Q) ∈ R implies:
• whenever P
Two agents P and Q are progressing rd -bisimilar, written P ≈ Progressing rd -bisimulation implies observation rd -congruence and is preserved by \, |, and +.
Proof Trivial. Proof The proof is standard and can be derived by following the same arguments applied in [26] .
Proposition 17 ≈
We conclude the presentation of behavioural equivalences by observing what follows. Relations like failure/testing equivalences are not considered in our setting since they turn out to be sensitive to divergent behaviours (cycles of τ actions), so that they would not be interesting to define the noninterferencebased security properties (as shown, e.g., in [15] ).
Security Properties
In this section we provide a taxonomy of security properties based on the equivalence relations introduced in the previous section. In essence, the several definitions we investigate are taken from the classification of security properties described in [13, 15] for a synchronous communication model, which are in turn inspired by the noninterference theory introduced in [17] . In the setting of a Linda-like asynchronous communication model, the goal of such security definitions is to verify whether a low-level user can infer the behaviour of the high-level user by observing the content of the tuplespace at run time.
For the sake of readability, given L = {a 1 , . . . , a n } ⊆ M, we use the abbreviation P op L to stand for P op a 1 . . . op a n , with op ∈ {\, /}.
Trace-based Properties
We start the presentation by defining the first natural formalization of the standard noninterference idea: the nondeterministic noninterference property. The intuition behind this property is that there is no observable distinction, from the low-level user standpoint, between the behaviour of the system when high-level inputs are accepted and the behaviour of the same system when none of the high-level inputs are executed. In the setting of SAL, we change such an intuition by observing that the low-level view of the tuplespace is not to be affected by high-level input/read operations performed on the tuplespace. In a trace-based scenario this intuition is expressed by requiring that for each trace including high-level input/read operations there exists another trace, containing no high-level input/read operations, such that the two traces are the same from the viewpoint of a low-level observer. We formalize the related property, termed Nondeterministic Noninterference (NNI, for short) [13] , by defining the rd -trace NNI (rd -NNI). For this purpose, we introduce the following notation: Function low : L * → Act * L takes a trace γ and removes all the high-level actions from it (i.e., low (γ) returns the low-level sub-sequence of γ), and function highir : L * → (Act H ∩ I) * extracts from a trace the sub-sequence formed by all of its high-level input and read operations.
In synchronous communication models, NNI is not adequate to reveal interferences due to high-level outputs. In particular, the emission of a high-level output occurs if and only if a corresponding input offered by the external environment is available. Such an input could never arrive, thus causing a system deadlock. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the noninterference property by symmetrically handling input and output actions. Such an intuition leads to the definition of Strong Nondeterministic Noninterference (SNNI, for short), which states that both high-level inputs and high-level outputs must not affect the low-level behaviour of the system. In the setting of SAL we introduce the rd -trace SNNI (rd -SNNI), which intuitively states that a low-level user should not be able to guess the content of the high-level portion of the tuplespace by interacting with the low-level part of the tuplespace.
In an asynchronous setting a strong version of the noninterference property is not needed, as we now formally show in the context of SAL. In fact, since output is asynchronous, the high-level user cannot prevent the system from executing an out(a) operation or, in other words, there is no relation between the emission of a message and the behaviour of the environment. In a sense, information can only flow from transmitters to receivers, while the vice versa does not hold. As a consequence, high-level output operations cannot help the low-level user to deduce the behaviour of the high-level user.
Proposition 20 P ∈ rd -NNI ⇔ P ∈ rd -SNNI.
Proof (⇐) It immediately follows from the definitions of rd -NNI and rd -SNNI.
(⇒) By hypothesis, ∀γ ∈ T (P ), ∃δ ∈ T (P ) such that highir (δ) = and low (δ) ∈ S(low (γ)). Since highir (δ) = and output is non-blocking, there exists δ ∈ T (P ) such that δ = low (δ), from which the result follows.
Both rd -NNI and rd -SNNI can be given an algebraic characterization based on SAL, as stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 21 (SAL versions of rd -NNI and rd -SNNI)
and ∃δ ∈ T (P ) such that γ = low (δ) and highir (δ) = , from which the result follows.
, from which we derive the result, since δ ∈ T (P ).
On the other hand, ∀γ ∈ T (P/M H ), ∃γ ∈ T (P ) such that low (γ ) = γ. By hypothesis, ∃δ ∈ T (P ) such that δ ∈ S(low (γ )), from which we derive the result, since δ ∈ T (P \M H ).
The following examples make it clear the relation between the properties presented above and the counterparts defined in the synchronous setting of [13] . Fig. 1 ). Formally, the agent is not rd -NNI. Similarly, in the synchronous setting of [13] , the corresponding agent is not NNI as the low-level output is blocked until the execution of the high-level input, which is an event governed by the high-level user. 
Example 22 Consider agent in(h).out(l).0, with h ∈ M

. Agent in(h).out(l).0 -the tuplespace from the low-level viewpoint.
The intuition behind the example above is that NNI and rd -NNI capture the same kind of interferences. This is because both synchronous and asynchronous models of communication consider inputs as blocking operations. 
Fig. 2. Agent out(h).out(l)
.0 -the tuplespace from the low-level viewpoint.
As an expected result, in a synchronous communication model the high-level user has at its disposal more kinds of interferences with respect to the asynchronous setting to set up a covert channel from high level to low level. Indeed, when communication is asynchronous, outputs cannot be exploited to deduce the behaviour of the high-level user.
We now investigate the relation between the two different models of communication by considering other security properties based on the noninterference approach to information flow analysis. Among them, we choose the most intuitive security property defined in the process algebraic setting of [13] : Nondeducibility of Composition (NDC, for short). Such a property explicitly states what a high-level user can do and how it can interact with the system in order to affect the low-level behaviour of the system. More precisely, the high-level interferences are determined by checking the effect of putting in parallel a high-level agent with the system. In the context of SAL, NDC reveals which kind of interactions between the tuplespace and the high-level user contribute to establish an information flow. The definition of rd -trace NDC (rd -NDC) is based on the function lowtr : A → P(Act * L ), which returns the set of traces of an agent P as observed by a low-level user:
A SAL characterization of rd -NDC is as follows.
Proposition 25 (SAL version of rd -NDC)
P ∈ rd -NDC ⇔ P/M H ≈ T rd (P |Π)\M H for all Π ∈ A H .
Proof
The result immediately derives from lowtr (P ) = lowtr (Q) if and only if
Differently from rd -NNI and rd -SNNI, rd -NDC is not decidable. This is because of the universal quantification over all high-level agents. However, like in the synchronous setting, a static characterization of rd -NDC is given by rd -SNNI, which is equal to rd -NDC despite of their very different intuitions and formalizations.
Proposition 26 P ∈ rd -NDC ⇔ P ∈ rd -SNNI.
(γ). On the other hand, by hypothesis we have that if
Note that from such a result and from Prop. 20 we immediately derive that rd -NDC = rd -NNI. That means the real interference caused by Π has some effect only on the high-level input/read interface of P . In practice, P can perform all of its high-level output operations independently of the behaviour of Π, as they model signals whose occurrence is indistinguishable from internal operations. Instead, the high-level inputs of P can be delayed (refused) depending on the interactions between P and Π. Formally, the NDC-like interleaving model of abstraction is adequate to deal with high-level input/read operations, while the NNI-like hiding-based model of abstraction is adequate to deal with highlevel output operations, as also emphasized, e.g., in [29] . On the basis of such considerations, we now give the following alternative characterization of NDC, called rd -NDC out , which abstracts away from high-level output operations before composing in parallel P with a high-level output agent Π ∈ A O H .
Definition 27 (rd -NDC with respect to high-level output agents)
P ∈ rd -NDC out ⇔ lowtr (P ) = lowtr (((P/ O M H )|Π)\M H ) for all Π ∈ A O H .
Proposition 28 (SAL version of rd -NDC
The rd -NDC out property is quantified over all high-level output agents, i.e. high-level agents that perform internal and output operations only. In spite of such a reduced set of testers, rd -NDC out turns out to be equal to rd -NDC, which is a result that immediately derives from the following proposition.
In practice, in an asynchronous communication model where the observational power of the external low-level observer is determined by the rd -trace semantics, the expressive power of each interfering attacker is defined by the highlevel outputs it performs.
The intuition behind the rd -NDC out property is the same as that underlying the definition of Nondeducibility on Strategies of [34] (NDS, for short). The model used in [34] consists of a nondeterministic state machine that is controlled by a low-level user and by a high-level user. Inputs to the machine come from both users and, on the basis of the received values, the machine produces separate outputs for both users. NDS states that a system P is secure when all of its low-level views are still possible when composing P with any high-level strategy Π. By employing a definition borrowed from [34] , a high-level strategy Π = Π → High Input, where each function reads the previous pair of high-level input and output and returns the next highlevel input. The NDS definition model requires the input totality property, i.e. systems are always able to accept any input or, in other words, outputs are never blocked. In practice, a nondeterministic state machine can emit its outputs regardless of the environment behaviour. In our model, the communication medium, which is explicitly modeled by the tuplespace, has, in a sense, the input totality property, since it ensures that output is a non-blocking operation. Similarly to the NDS definition, rd -NDC out determines, on the basis of the past interactions between P and the high-level agent Π, which input/read actions of P are enabled for execution. Instead, the output actions of P are completely disregarded since they are not under the control of Π. Note that in the synchronous setting of [13] , NDC and NDS cannot be directly compared, unless the input totality property is explicitly stated. However, we point out that by avoiding the need for explicitly introducing processes that enable all possible inputs, in our model we also avoid infinitary descriptions (differently from, e.g., [21] ).
In the following, we formalize the relation between rd -NDC out and NDS by giving an alternative characterization of rd -NDC out inspired by NDS. To this aim, we first replace the notion of high process Π by a notion of high-level strategy in the same line of [34] . Then, we check if the low-level view of the tuplespace is invariant under changes in the high-level strategy applied to P . Our definition of strategy must take into account two issues. On the one hand, a strategy should control both input and read actions of P , which are blocking operations whose execution is guided by the environment. On the other hand, it is not worth considering the output actions of P , because they occur independently of the environment behaviour. Therefore, a high-level strategy just determines which (if any) high-level input/read actions the system is allowed to execute step by step.
Formally, we define a high-level strategy as a partial function S : (Act H ) * → Act H ∩ I. In the following, we assume that each state of the labelled transition system associated to agent P and strategy S is described by a pair (P , γ), where P is a SAL agent reachable from P and γ expresses the sequence of highlevel operations executed along the path from P to P by following strategy Table 3 Operational semantics of the strategy operator.
S. For the initial state, the associated configuration is (P, ). Note that for each agent P reachable from P we can have several different states of the form (P , γ) depending on the number of traces (differing in their high-level actions) that may be executed to reach P . We now are ready to introduce a strategy operator (P, γ)|S, which is defined by the semantic rules of Table 3 .
(P, γ)|S blocks all the high-level input/read actions of P except for the one enabled by S, which is executed as an unobservable transition. On the other hand, all the high-level output actions of P are simply hidden as they are not observable at low level. Moreover, note that γ stores all the high-level actions that are executed before reaching P . Then, our definition of Nondeducibility on Strategies for SAL agents, which we call rd -NDS, is as follows.
Definition 30 (rd -NDS) P ∈ rd -NDS ⇔ lowtr (P ) = lowtr ((P, )|S) for all high-level strategies S.
Proposition 31 (SAL version of rd -NDS) P ∈ rd -NDS ⇔ P/M H ≈ T rd (P, )|S for all high-level strategies S.
As in the case of rd -NDC, we need a static characterization of rd -NDS, which is not decidable because of the universal quantification over all high-level strategies.
Proposition 32 P ∈ rd -NDS ⇔ P ∈ rd -NNI.
Proof Let P be a SAL agent. Table 3 we easily derive 
(⇒) By taking the strategy that does not associate any high-level action to any sequence, by hypothesis and by the semantic rules of
P/M H ≈ T rd (P \ I M H )/M H . (⇐) Let S be a
high-level strategy. On the one hand, T ((P, )|S) ⊆ T (P/M H ).
Hence, ∀γ ∈ T ((P, )|S), ∃δ ∈ T (P/M H ) such that δ ∈ S(γ). On the other hand, if γ ∈ T (P/M H ) then ∃δ ∈ T ((P \ I M H )/M H ) such that δ ∈ S(γ).
Since T ((P \ I M H )/M H ) ⊆ T ((P, )|S) then δ ∈ T ((P, )|S).
From such a result we immediately derive that rd -NDS = rd -NDC out . We can conclude by observing that all the security properties defined so far have the same expressive power. Hence, compositionality results for all properties can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 33
Proof The proof is standard. It follows from Prop. 6 and from the corresponding proof of [13] .
The classification of security properties together with a comparison with the synchronous setting of [13] is summarized in Fig. 3 . There, by NDCIT we denote the NDC property restricted to input total systems, which is the version of NDC introduced in [13] as a counterpart of the NDS property of [34] . We omit the definition of further security properties -in particular those properties requiring the input totality condition -as they would not yield novel insights in our setting, where the asynchronous communication model is explicitly assumed.
Bisimulation-based Properties
In this section we rephrase some security property in the context of the bisimulation semantics. We start by discussing in detail the case of the weak rdbisimulation. On the one hand, we show that the taxonomy we obtain introduces inclusion relations that do not coincide with those observed in the previous section. On the other hand, since weak rd -bisimulation implies rdtrace equivalence, every property we present in this section is finer than its trace-based counterpart. Finally, we discuss the extension to the case of the congruence-based semantics.
In the following definition we introduce the ≈ B rd -based variants of NNI, SNNI, and NDC, respectively.
Definition 34 (rd -BNNI, rd -BSNNI, rd -BNDC)
With respect to the trace-based scenario, the equivalence relation between rd -BNNI and rd -BSNNI does not hold. This is because the weak rd -bisimulation equivalence is able to detect deadlocks and to discriminate agents according to the nondeterministic structure of their labelled transition systems. [13] , P is neither BNNI nor BSNNI. [13] , Q is neither BNNI nor BSNNI.
Example 35 Consider agent P def = out(h).in(h).out(l), where h ∈ M H and l ∈ M L , and verify the rd -BSNNI property. On the one hand, the semantics of P \M H is described as follows:
(out(h).in(h).out(l))\M H r τ c ( h |in(h).out(l))\M H r τ c (out(l))\M H r τ c ( l )\M H rl c r 0
Intuitively, the agent emits a high-level tuple h and then can consume it since the environment is prevented from observing h. Then, the agent outputs the low-level message, which can be read/consumed by the low-level user. On the other hand, the semantics of P/M H is given by:
(out(h).in(h).out(l))/M H r τ c ( h |in(h).out(l))/M H r τ τ ¡ ¡ ¡ (out(l))/M H r τ ' (in(h).out(l))/M H r τ t t t t τ t t t t ( h |out(l))/M H r ' τ τ c ( l )/M H r r ' c ( h | l )/M H τ ll c r r ' c 0 τ ( h )/M H((out(h).in(h).out(l))\ I M H )/M H r τ c (( h |in(h).out(l))\ I M H )/M H r τ ¡ ¡ ¡ ((out(l))\ I M H )/M H r τ c (( l )\ I M H )/M H rl c r 0 ' ((in(h).out(l))\ I M H )/M H r τ
As a consequence, P ∈ rd -BNNI. The problem revealed by the rd -BNNI property can be solved by requiring h to be a local name of P that cannot be consumed by any high-level user. For instance, we have that P \h ∈ rd -BNNI, rd -BSNNI. Finally, we point out that in the synchronous setting of
Example 36 Consider the following slight variant of agent P of Example 35: Q def = out(h).in(h).out(l) + in(h). We first observe that
As we have seen in the examples above, rd -BNNI and rd -BSNNI do not match whenever the agent can consume a tuple that it has previously emitted. Indeed, in such a case the interleaving between the high-level user operations and the agent activities interferes with the low-level view of the tuplespace. We can avoid such a kind of interference if we assume that the agent distinguishes between tuples offered to the environment, which are disregarded by the agent itself, and tuples that the agent uses for its internal calculations, which must be modeled through local names and cannot be observed by the environment.
Definition 37 An agent P ∈ A is said to be a non-consuming producer (ncp, for short) if ∀P . P ⇒ P , whenever
An ncp agent does not read/consume the tuples offered to the environment by the agent itself. For instance, agent P of Example 35 is not an ncp agent. Indeed, as we have seen, P can first emit a tuple h , and then can either offer it to the environment or consume it via a corresponding input operation. On the other hand, process P \h is an ncp agent, since it cannot offer a tuple h to the environment. We can argue similarly for agent Q described in Example 36.
Lemma 38 Let a |P be an ncp agent. Then ( a |P )\a ≈ B rd P \a.
Proof It is enough to observe that ( a |P )\a and its derivatives do not enablē a labelled transitions and, by definition of ncp agent, do not enable synchronizations involving tuple a .
Intuitively, in an asynchronous communication model it is natural to view an output operation offered to the environment as a signal emitted by the agent, which is eventually received by an external process. Under such an assumption, many realistic systems can be interpreted as non-consuming producers. By restricting ourselves to ncp agents, we now show that rd -BNNI and rd -BSNNI coincide. Instead, we recall that in the synchronous communication setting BNNI ⊆ BSNNI and BSNNI ⊆ BNNI [13] .
Proposition 39 If P ∈ A is an ncp agent, then
Proof Let P be a SAL agent and R be a relation defined as follows:
We now prove that R is a weak rd-bisimulation up to ≈ B rd
1
. By inspection of possible cases, it follows: From the proof of Prop. 39 we immediately derive the following corollary, which confirms that the high-level output operations do not interfere with the low-level content of the tuplespace in the case of ncp agents.
since the transitions enabled in P \M H are a subset of the transitions enabled in
(P \ I M H )/M H ; • if (P \ I M H )/M H π → (P \ I M H )/M H ,
where π is either a visible action or a τ action that is not obtained by hiding ah labelled transition enabled in
P \ I M H , then P \M H π → P \M H , since π models an event of term P that is not restricted in P \M H . • if P ≡ h |P and (( h |P )\ I M H )/M H τ → (P \ I M H )/M H ,
Corollary 40 If P ∈ A is an ncp agent, then
P/ O M H ≈ B rd P \ O M H .
Proposition 41 (inclusion relations) (1) rd -BNDC ⊂ rd -BNNI. (2) rd -BNDC ⊂ rd -BSNNI.
Proof Let P be a SAL agent. To show condition (1), consider the process that enables all the high-level input operations:
Π def = a∈M H in(a).Π. Then, by hypothesis P/M H ≈ B rd (P |Π)\M H ≈ B rd (P/ O M H )\M H ≈ B rd P \ I M H /M H . To show condition (2), consider Π def = 0. Then, by hypothesis P/M H ≈ B rd (P |∅)\M H ≈ B rd P \M H .
The inclusions are strict. For instance, agent out(l)+rd (h).rd (h ).out(l), with h, h ∈ M H and l ∈ M L , is both rd -BNNI and rd -BSNNI, but not rd -BNDC. Indeed, it is enough to take Π def = out(h).
Note that the same inclusion relations hold in the synchronous setting of [13] . (2) While both rd -BSNNI and rd -BNNI are decidable, rd -BNDC is not, because of the universal quantification over all high-level agents. Here, differently from the previous section, we do not provide a static characterization of rd -BNDC. Instead, we define a decidable property that does not involve composition with every high-level process Π and is stricter than rd -BNDC. Such a property, termed Strong rd -BNDC (rd -SBNDC, for short), is defined in [13] .
Lemma 42 (rd -BNDC: alternative definition)
By employing the alternative definition of rd -BNDC given in Lemma 42, we now show that rd -SBNDC is finer than rd -BNDC.
Proposition 44 rd -SBNDC ⊂ rd -BNDC.
Proof Let P be a SAL agent, Π be a high-level agent and R be a relation defined as follows: 
By following the same argument shown in the proof of Prop. 39, we now prove that R is a weak rd-bisimulation up to ≈ B rd . By inspection of possible transitions, the unique interesting case is given by
(P |Π )\M H τ → (P |Π )\M H , such that there exist α, α ∈ Act H , with P α → P , Π α → Π ,≈ B rd P \M H . Therefore, since (P \M H , (P |Π )\M H ) ∈ R it
follows that R is a weak rd-bisimulation up to ≈ B rd and P is rd -BNDC. The inclusion is strict. For instance, it can be verified that the following agent out(l) + out(l).out(l ) + out(l).rd (h).out(l ), with h ∈ M H and l, l ∈ M L , is rd -BNDC but not rd -SBNDC.
Similarly as in the trace-based scenario, it is not worth imposing any check on the high-level outputs, provided that we restrict ourselves to ncp agents. To show this, we define a variant of rd -SBNDC, termed rd -SBNDC out , which does not consider high-level outputs at all. In spite of such a relaxation, rd -SBNDC and rd -SBNDC out have the same expressive power. Lemma 38 and Prop. 9, we have ( h |P )\M H ≈ B rd P \M H , from which we derive the result.
Proposition 46 If P ∈ A is an ncp agent, then
P ∈ rd-SBNDC ⇔ P ∈ rd-SBNDC out . Proof (⇒) Trivial.
Corollary 47 If P ∈ A is an ncp agent, then rd -SBNDC out ⊂ rd -BNDC.
The corollary states that a property that does not perform any check on the high-level outputs of an ncp agent is stricter than a property that involves composition of the agent with every high-level process. Since the high-level outputs do not affect the result of the security check, the definition of rd -BNDC can be relaxed. In particular, we can hide the output operations of P before composing in parallel P and Π and then assume that Π can perform output operations only. Formally, similarly as in the trace-based scenario, the most intuitive and natural notion of NDC is given by the following property, termed rd -BNDC out .
Definition 48 (rd -BNDC with respect to high-level output agents)
Proof The proof is standard. It follows from Prop. 9 and from the corresponding proof of [13] .
The classification of security properties together with a comparison with the synchronous setting of [13] is summarized in Fig. 4 .
We now show what happens if we replace ≈ B rd by = rd . Obviously, since = rd implies ≈ B rd we have that the properties rephrased in the setting of observation rd -congruence are stricter than the corresponding properties defined so far.
As far as rd -BNNI and rd -BSNNI are concerned, we call their counterparts rd -ENNI and rd -ESNNI, respectively. Unfortunately, such properties do not preserve the result of Prop. 39. Instead, the following result holds. From Prop. 50 we observe that the inverse inclusion relation holds for ncp agents that do not enable high-level actions at their initial state.
Proposition 50 If P ∈ A is an ncp agent, then
The counterpart of rd -BNDC, called rd -ENDC, preserves the result of Prop. 41, i.e. it implies both rd -ENNI and rd -ESNNI. This can be easily seen by replacing ≈ B rd by = rd in the corresponding proof. In particular, by applying the same counterexample, it can be viewed that the inclusion is strict.
As far as rd -SBNDC is concerned, we point out that the corresponding property, called rd -SENDC, does not preserve the inclusion relation of Prop. 44, as shown by the same counterexample in the proof of Prop. 50. Moreover, note that rd-SENDC does not imply neither rd-ENNI nor rd-ESNNI. For instance, agent in(h)|in(a) is rd-SENDC, but not rd-ENNI, rd-ESNNI. This is because observation rd -congruence requires the first unobservable action enabled at the initial state of an agent to be matched by (at least) a corresponding move of the other agent. On the other hand, the result of Prop. 46 still holds in the = rd based scenario, as can be easily verified by replacing ≈ B rd by = rd in the corresponding proof. That means, in the case of ncp agents it is not worth imposing any condition on the outputs performed by a system in order to reveal its covert channels. More interestingly, although = rd is preserved by | and +, we have that rd-SENDC is not compositional with respect to such operators. From the observations above, we can derive the classification of = rd -based security properties depicted in Fig. 5 .
As an expected result, replacing = rd by ≈ p rd leads to the same considerations surveyed above. The corresponding properties, which we call rdp-BNNI, rdp-BSNNI, rdp-BNDC, and rdp-SBNDC, respectively, are stricter than the counterparts based on = rd . Moreover, it is worth noting what follows. With respect to the = rd -based scenario, we do not have a counterpart of Prop. 50. [26] . Hence, P is not rdp-BNNI.
Example 52 Similarly as seen in the counterexample of Prop. 50, we have that agent h |in(l) is rdp-BNNI but not rdp-BSNNI. Now, taken agents
Similarly as seen in the = rd -based scenario, we have that rdp-BNDC implies both rdp-BNNI and rdp-BSNNI, as can be easily verified by applying the same proof of Prop. 41. As far as rdp-SBNDC is concerned, we can argue as in the case of the rd -SENDC property. In particular, the same counterexamples shown above reveal that rdp-SBNDC is not compositional with respect to | and +. In conclusion, in the case of the ≈ p rd -based semantics, the inclusion relation among the security properties is as shown in Fig. 5 .
The Access Monitor and the Master/Worker Examples
As a case study we now consider two examples, one taken from the synchronous communication framework of [15] -a monitor accessing a shared memoryand one taken from the classical coordination literature -a master/worker system coordinating job execution [11] . The former is used to show in practice the difference, in terms of information flow analysis, between the two communication models. The latter emphasizes the adequacy of SAL in modeling and analysing typical examples of the coordination world.
System AM of Table 4 represents an access monitor that serves read and write requests on a low-level binary variable enforcing the multi-level security policy [3] . The policy says that a process at σ-security level may only (i) write variables at the same level as σ or above (write up), and (ii) read variables at the same level as σ or below (read down). The system is made of agent Monitor , which accepts the user requests that follow the security policy, and agent Low Bit, which directly controls the binary variable, whose initial value is 0 as specified by tuple b 0 . All the interactions between Monitor and Low Bit and the operations internally performed by Low Bit are local, i.e. every user cannot offer/consume the related tuples. Formally, such a condition is guaranteed by the restrictions defined in system AM . Agent Monitor is the unique process of the system that can interact with the environment through messages exchanged via the tuplespace. In particular, agent Monitor can consume the messages low r , denoting a low-level read request, high r , denoting a high-level read request, low w 0 and low w 1 , denoting the low-level write requests. Moreover, after a high-(low-) level read request, agent Monitor can emit the high-(low-) level messages h i (l i ), for i ∈ {0, 1}, denoting that the value i is communicated to the environment. According to the multi-level security policy, high-level write requests (high w 0 and high w 1 ) are not satisfied, since a high-level user cannot write a low-level variable. Finally, we point out that AM is an ncp agent.
In the following, we assume that a single low-level user interacts with the system and we show what such a user can learn about the high-level operations performed on the low-level variable. First, system AM is rd-BSNNI. The intuition is that all the high-level operations do not affect the content of the low-level variable and do not prevent the low-level user from accessing such a variable. Since AM is an ncp agent, rd-BNNI holds too. Moreover, it can be shown that AM is rd-SBNDC (rd-SBNDC out ). Formally, the low-level view of AM does not change when executing the high-level input in(high r ) denoting the reception of a high-level read request. In particular, even if the environment refuses to consume the high-level output out(h i ), which is provided by the monitor in response to the high-level read request, the system does not deadlock. This is because of the asynchronous communication assumption. In- Table 4 Access monitor example stead, the corresponding system based on synchronous communication does not satisfy SBNDC [15] . Finally, by assuming the = rd semantics, the system is not secure. For instance, AM is not rd-ENNI since, e.g., the internal move that can be performed by hiding action in(high r ) cannot be matched by an internal move whenever in(high r ) is prevented. Now, let us consider a variant of agent Monitor that accepts high-level write requests, thus violating the write up condition. Formally, this behaviour is obtained by replacing in(high w 0 ).Monitor + in(high w 1 ).Monitor by: in(high w 0 ).out(w 0 ).in(ack ).Monitor + in(high w 1 ).out(w 1 ).in(ack ).Monitor . After such a modification, rd-BNNI and rd-NNI do not hold any more. For both properties, the security check captures the fact that, e.g., a low-level user that does not perform write operations can perceive the high-level interference by reading two different values (l 0 and l 1 ) in two different read operations. The same covert channel is revealed by BNNI (NNI) in [15] .
As another variant of agent Monitor , assume that a high-level output is added to inform the high-level user that a low-level write operation occurred. This can be modeled by adding the high-level output out(written i), for i ∈ {0, 1}, as follows: in(low w 0 ).out(w 0 ).in(ack ).out(written 0).Monitor + in(low w 1 ).out(w 1 ).in(ack ).out(written 1).Monitor . In the synchronous setting such a version of the monitor does not satisfy SNNI [15] , because the high-level user can refuse the feedback concerning the low-level write operation. Hence, two consecutive low-level write operations can be exploited to inform the low-level user that the high-level user is still active. Such a behaviour is more than enough to set up a 1-bit covert channel from high level to low level. In our asynchronous setting, it can be verified that such a version of the access monitor is still secure. In particular, all the weak rd -bisimulation based security properties defined in Sect. 3 hold. This is because the high-level user cannot block or delay the output offered by the monitor, which is interpreted as an independent activity (a signal) instead of a synchronous, direct interaction with the high-level user.
in(low req).out(job).in(result).out(low res).Monitor + in(high req).out(job).in(result).out(high res).Monitor
The second system we model is a typical example taken from the coordination world: a master/worker system for the interaction between a set of clients, called masters, which produce job requests, and a set of servers, called workers, which process each request and return a result. Communication among the agents is asynchronous. In particular, a master produces a job request by sending a tuple to a shared tuplespace, while a worker performs the job by consuming the related tuple and by emitting a new tuple containing the result. In a multi-level security system we may imagine that jobs at different security levels are handled. For this purpose, we employ a monitor ensuring that the result of a high-level job is not communicated to a low-level master.
For the sake of simplicity, in Table 5 we model a scenario with a single worker interacting with a monitor that accepts job requests from masters at different levels of security. The system, called MW , is made of agent Monitor , which accepts a high-(resp. low-) level job request through a high-(resp. low-) level tuple of type high req (resp. low req), and agent Worker , which models the unique worker that executes the job passed by the monitor. After execution, agent Worker generates a result that can be consumed by the monitor only. In turn, agent Monitor emits such a result in the form of a high-(resp. low-) level Table 6 Master/Worker example without monitor tuple of type high res (resp. low res). Similarly as seen in the case of the access monitor example, it can be observed that the system is secure. In particular, the system is rd-SBNDC, because the potential interaction with a high-level master does not prevent the system from serving low-level job requests. Again, note that the emission of a high-level tuple (of type high res) is an operation that is independent of the environment behaviour and, therefore, cannot be blocked by a misbehaving high-level master.
The multi-level security constraint can be guaranteed without resorting to the monitor. Indeed, we can define a set of high-level workers and a set of low-level workers that separately handle high-and low-level job requests, respectively. The separation of concerns, as formally illustrated in Table 6 which also shows two possible master processes, ensures that operations at different levels of security cannot interfere each other. In essence, each master directly communicates only with the corresponding worker through the tuplespace. Formally, we can verify that, e.g., system Low Worker |High Worker is rd-BSNNI. More interestingly, the system is secure independently of the behaviour of the highlevel masters, that means the system is both rd-BNDC and rd-SBNDC. Now, assume that the tuplespace has a limited number n of slots where the job results can be stored. Formally, each slot is modeled by a tuple of type free slot. Then, each emission of a tuple of type low res must be preceded by action in(free slot), modeling the intention of reserving a slot, while each consumption of a tuple of type low res must be followed by action out(free slot), expressing that a slot is now free. 
= in(init job).out(low req).in(low res).out(free slot).
in(end job).Low Master where actions of type init job and end job are low-level actions denoting the beginning and the termination of a job, while all the actions of type free slot are high-level actions, because we do not want a low-level observer to check the capacity of the tuplespace. Moreover, assume that initially the system contains n tuples of type free slot, with n ≥ 1, and that a single low-level master is modeled. Then, the limited size of the tuplespace can be exploited to set up a covert channel. Indeed, consider n high-level masters that fill up the tuplespace with job requests. If such masters do not consume the results that are emitted by the high-level worker, then the low-level worker cannot communicate the result of a low-level job because of the tuplespace overflow. Formally, we can verify that the following system: MW def = (High Worker |Low Worker |Low Master n times | free slot ), with S = {low req, low res}, is not rd-BSNNI. Intuitively, if several agents at different security levels access a shared memory, then there exists an unavoidable 1-bit covert channel caused by the filling and emptying operations performed by the high-level users.
Related Work and Conclusion
We presented a classification of security properties for several different semantics in the framework of a process algebra with asynchronous communication based on Linda-like coordination primitives. In the following, we summarize the comparison between the taxonomy we obtained and that illustrated in [13] , which is based on a synchronous communication model:
• NNI and rd-NNI have the same expressive power in the sense that they capture the same interferences, i.e. the covert channels that are caused by high-level inputs. This is because in both communication models input is a blocking operation.
• In a synchronous setting SNNI is stricter than NNI, while BSNNI and BNNI do not satisfy any inclusion relation. In our asynchronous setting rd-NNI and rd-SNNI have the same expressive power. Such an equivalence holds also when passing to the weak rd-bisimulation equivalence, provided that we restrict ourselves to the family of non-consuming producers.
• By defining a NDS-like property [34] , we have shown that rd -NDC has a stricter relation than NDC with the original idea of NDS.
• In an asynchronous setting, the security properties can be relaxed by weakening the constraint imposed on outputs. In particular, rd -NDC (rd -BNDC for ncp agents) can be simplified by hiding high-level outputs and considering high-level processes that perform output operations only.
A major direction for future work is the implementation in a software tool of the security checks based on the noninterference properties. For this purpose, it would be interesting to investigate the possibility of extending the security checker illustrated in [15] to deal with SAL processes. Similarly, we think that the theory recently developed in [6, 28] could be adapted with minor changes in the setting of SAL. To this aim, it is enough to extend the generalized notions of weak bisimulation of [6] in our asynchronous setting. This can be done by enriching the definitions of [6] to deal with read operations exactly as done in the case of the weak rd -bisimulation, which is an extension of the weak bisimulation with an additional relaxed condition on the read operations. Then, properties like persistent BNDC (P BNDC) and progressing persistent BNDC (PP BNDC) can be rephrased in SAL by following the same approach adopted when passing from SBNDC to rd -SBNDC. The main benefit would be that the related verification techniques could be applied in our asynchronous setting too. For instance, a characterization of P BNDC based on the unwinding conditions [23] and on the weak rd -bisimulation, call it rd -P BNDC, states that P is rd -P BNDC if and only if ∀P . P ⇒ P and ∀P . P α → P , where α ∈ Act H , then P τ ⇒ P and P \Act H ≈ B rd P \Act H . As can be easily verified, rd -P BNDC preserves the same results known for P BNDC, i.e. it is compositional (except with respect to summation) and rd -SBNDC ⊂ rd -P BNDC ⊂ rd -BNDC. In particular, by rephrasing the proof of Prop. 46, it follows that high-level outputs can be disregarded in the definition of rd -P BNDC, which can be formally redefined as follows: an ncp agent P is rd -P BNDC if and only if ∀P . P ⇒ P and ∀P . P α → P , where α ∈ Act H ∩I, then P τ ⇒ P and P \Act H ≈ B rd P \Act H . More interestingly, PP BNDC is essentially a version of P BNDC based on the progressing bisimulation [26] . However, differently from rdp-SBNDC, it is preserved by parallel composition and summation. Hence, in order to obtain fully compositionality in our asynchronous setting, the adequate property to be considered -together with the progressing bisimulation semantics -is P BNDC instead of SBNDC.
Another issue that is planned for future work is the extension of SAL with other Linda-like primitives, like conditional input and conditional read operations [8] . Then, once that automated tools supporting analysis will be provided, it would be interesting to investigate the effectiveness of our approach by analysing some complex case study taken from the literature of coordination models, like, e.g., conference management on the Web [12] , asynchronous circuits [5] , and distributed architectures [27] .
Along the line of investigation inspired by the noninterference approach, other works in the literature cope with secure information flow analysis and asynchronous communication model. A seminal work in this direction is that by Smith and Volpano in [33] . There, the authors develop a type system to ensure secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language with nondeterministic scheduling policy. The asynchronous communication model is formalized by means of a single global memory, shared by all threads, through which the concurrent threads can interact. A more restrictive type system is also defined which guarantees noninterference regardless of how (non-probabilistic) scheduling is done. Starting from this point, other works investigate the property of noninterference for well-typed systems with asynchronous parallelism [22, 7] . In [22] the authors show that the calculus of [33] is an embedding of a typed calculus that is a variant of π-calculus. The authors of [7] present a type system that is more natural and less restrictive than that of [33] . Both in [22] and in [7] the behavioural theory of typed processes is based on the bisimilarity theory. Similarly, in [20] resource access control and secure information flow are verified using a typed asynchronous π-calculus. There, the noninterference result is based on a notion of may testing equivalence. The result has been extended in [19] with respect to the more discriminating must testing equivalence. In [32] a security condition called causal flow property is defined to formally prove that software wrappers, which in real systems represent the glue between interacting components, actually preserve secure information flow constraints. This is done in the context of a typed box -π process calculus, which can be viewed as an extension of an asynchronous version of the π-calculus.
